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L Introduction

This brief commentary argues two points. First, that unilateral uses of national
military force, like the December 16-19, 1998, air and cruise missile strikes carried

against Iraq by British and U.S.personnell to compel adherence to that
country&apos;s U.N. commitments regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD),2
out

clearly permissible under the language and circumstances surrounding the
adoption of Security Council resolution 687.3 And second, that among the options
being explored4 to both resolve the current impasse regarding WMD inspections
in Iraq,5 and assure that the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) does not
continue to be plagued by the halting progress which has marked its eight
year
existence, there is at least one viable option that has not been the subject of any
noticeable amount of public discussion.
are not
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I
See Francis X. C 11 n e s and Steven Lee M y e r s, Biggest Attack Since &apos;91 War
Britain Gives
-

Support, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1998,
Weapons Centers, N.Y. Times, ibid.,
Steven Lee M y

e r

s,

20, 1998, available
Dec. 23, 1998).
2

On

Al, col. 5. See also Philip Shenon, Strike Aims to Cripple
at A15, col. 3. Strike concluded after four days of bombing, see
U.S. and Britain End Raids on Iraq, Calling Mission a Success, N.Y. Times, Dec.
at

athttp://wwwnytimes.com/library/world/mideast/122098iraq-rpd.htmI (accessed

acceptance of the obligations under resolution 687, see Letter from the Foreign
of Iraq to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
(Apr. 6, 1991), U.N. Doc. S/22456. On the details of the obligations of resolution 687, see Plan for
the Implementation of Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687
(1991): Report
of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/22614,17 May 1991; Plan for Future
and

Iraqs

Minister of the

Republic

Ongoing Monitoring
Iraqs Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution
687 (1991): Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/22871/Rev.1, 2 Oct. 1991; Plan for Future
Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraqs Compliance with Paragraph 12 of Part C of Security
Council Resolution 687 (1991) and with the Requirements of
Paragraphs 3 and 5 of Resolution 707
(1991), U.N. Doc. S/22872/Rev.1, 20 Sept. 1991.
3
See U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), adopted Apr. 3, 1991, reprinted in: 30 Int&apos;l
Legal Mat. 847
Verification of

(1991). No attempt is made herein

justify
4

the

use

to

determine the

validity

of other bases that may be advanced

to

against Iraq.

See Barbara C

Jan. 14, 1999,
Jan. 15, 1999,
5

of force

at
at

r o s s e t t e, France, In Break With U.S., Urges End to
Iraq Embargo, N.Y. Times,
A6, col. 3; Jane P e r I e z, U.S. Proposes Easing U.N. Curbs on Iraq Oil, N.Y. Times,
A8, col. 1.

At the time of the

halted, and there
ber 16-19

might

impasse began

of this comment, all weapons inspection activities in Iraq had been
the fact that the joint U.S.-British bombing campaign of Decemend the possibility of future Iraqi cooperation on the inspection front. The current

writing

was concern over

with

Iraq blocking all but passive monitoring through equipment

on

August 5, 1998,
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matter of applications of national military force, not explithe
U.N., to secure compliance with the objectives of Security
by
citly
Council resolution 6876 has been intensified in recent weeks as a result of suggesYale Law
tions of the legality of such offered by Professor Ruth Wedgwood of the

The

relevancy

of the

authorized

leading periodicals on international
law.7 From the vantage of desiring a rational and ordered society based on the rule
of law, one should be extremely circumspect about suggesting the lawfulness of
the use of force, and hesitate offering any such suggestion in the absence of inexorable supporting evidence. As for public discussion of options that might resolve
the current inspection impasse and minimize the likelihood of a continuing onagain-off-again UNSCOM inspection process, the general nature of the threat
posed by atomic, biological, and chemical weaponry is alone enough to suggest
unquestioned relevancy. Biological and chemical weapons have been employed by
Iraq in the past,8 and there is great concern they may in the future be the weapon
of choice of lesser developed nations and terrorist organizations.9
School and

IL Use

appearing

of Force

to

in

one

Secure

of the world&apos;s

Compliance

With

Security Council Resolution

One of the arguments advanced in support of the thesis that it is lawful
use national military force&apos;to compel Iraqi observance of WMD

laterally
tions

turns

on

the fact that

Security Council

687
to

uni-

obliga-

resolution 687, which enunciates
end through the mechanism of an

obligations, brought the Gulf War to an
explicitly declared cease-fire. This is thought significant because that ended what
had essentially been a collaborative, yet nonetheless national, action undertaken in
France and many others.
a coordinated way by the United States, Great Britain,
As the argument goes, since the Gulf War had not been prosecuted by U.N. standof the Charter or the organization&apos;s coming forces acting under either article 43

those

been, and remains, up to the collaborating national states,
whether the termination of hostilities is to continue,
decide
and not the U.N., to
form
or another should be resumed.10
or military action of one
mand and

control,

argument has to do with the notion of the Gulf War as
action conducted essentially outside the context of the United Nations.

The central
a

military

it has

pillar of this

October 31, 1998, refusing to cooperate in any way with UNSCOM inspectors. See
Iraqs Sudden Rejection of Arms Scrutiny Brings U.S.Warning, N.Y. Times,
Backs
August 5, 1998, at A9, col. 1; Philip S h e n o n, U.S. Asserts It Will Consider Raids Unless Iraq
Down, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2,1998, at A12, col. 5.
6
In principal part, those objectives include restoring and securing stability in the region, and
destroying Saddam Hussein&apos;s atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.
7
The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of
See Ruth
and then

on

Barbara Crossette,

Wedgwood,
Against Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 Am. J. Int&apos;l L. 724 (1998).
8
See Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (1991); Human Rights
Watch, Iraq&apos;s Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds (1995).
9
See U.S.Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (1997), available at:
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prollf97/secil.htmI (accessed Jan. 4, 1999).
10 See
Wedgwood (note 7), at 725-727.

Force
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Iraq

by standing

U.N. armed

under the command and control of the U.N. itself.&quot; With
over 700,000 coalition troops under arms, 2000 military aircraft, and 100 warships,
it far and away exceeded any expedition the U.N. has ever mounted or attempted

to

was not

command.12 But

regard

the action

undoubtedly, there is good reason to believe few would
simply a coordinated military attack undertaken by cooperaacting independent of, and wholly divorced from, the United

just

as

tive national forces

Nations itself.13 Several

To

begin

as

pieces

of -evidence

are

supportive

of this line of

reasoning.

with, from the very day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Security Counjust the individual members acting in consort, condemned the invasion

cil, and not
and demanded, in resolution 660, by

0, with Yemen abstaining, that
Iraq &quot;withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces.-14 By this action,
unequivocally stated as being taken under Charter articles 39 and 40, the Security
a vote

of 14

to

Council made

plain it considered the organization itself seized of the matter. This
days later by the Council giving teeth to its withdrawal demand
through the imposition, under resolution 661, of a trade embargo.15 The effect of
this action was to supply member states with grounds for national measures of
trade restriction. Additionally, when it thereafter became apparent Iraq might be
circumventing the embargo, and discussion ensued regarding the possibility of
was

followed four

using military force to prevent such,16 authorization was sought from the
Security Council in the form of resolution 665, adopted 13 to 0, with Yemen and
Cuba abstaining. Immediate resort to unilateral military action was not had.17
Paragraph 1 of resolution 665, while acknowledging the then extant U.N. member
state cooperation with Kuwaiti efforts to deal with Iraq, makes clear that the use
of maritime forces may be necessary, but that such is

to occur

&quot;under the author-

ity of the Security Council ...&quot;.18 Further, the coalition forces that launched
Operation Desert Storm against Iraq on January 16, 1991, both sought and
obtained, in the form of Security Council resolution 678, U.N. imprimatur for

11

in

fact, prior

much

to

the

adoption

of Security Council resolution 678 in November of 1990, there

among the various states about whether the military forces poised to strike Iraq
should be under U.N. command, or continue under national control. The U.S. argued for national

was

wrangling

control and

prevailed.

See Abram C h a y e s, The Use of Force in the Persian

in the New International Order 3-4
12

See

13

For

Barry

E. C

a rte r

/Phillip

(Damrosch

&amp;

Gulf, in:

Law and Force

Scheffer, eds. 1991).

R. Tr i m b I e, International Law 1408

(2d ed. 1995).

contrast, compare Eugene V. R o s t o w, Until What? Enforcement Action or
Collective Self-Defense?, 85 Am. J. Int&apos;l L. 506 (1991) (self-defense action) with Oscar Schachter,
an

interesting

United Nations Law in the Gulf
14
15
16

Conflict, ibid., at 452 (overtones of enforcement action
(1990), para. 2, adopted Aug. 2, 1990.
See U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990), adopted Aug. 6, 1990.

as

well).

See U.N. Doc. S/RES/660

On the fact the U.S. took the

position during these discussions that force could be used
authorizing such, see Chayes (note 11), 3 (suggesting
self-defense was the basis for the U.S.position). See also, Carter/Trimble (note 12), at 1402
(suggesting authority present in earlier adopted resolution 661).
17
See U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990), adopted Aug. 25, 1990.
without

18

a new

See ibid.

resolution from the Council

at

para. 1.
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They did not presume to act outside the United Nations. It cannot
be denied that paragra-ph 2 of that resolution speaks of &quot;authoriz[ing]&quot; the use of
all necessary means to remove Iraq.20 But such language can just as easily accomtheir efforts.19

signifies affirmative empowerment as one that signifies
power already in existence. Paragraph 4 of resolution 678
permission
seems to tilt in the direction of the first reading with its request that coalition
states &quot;keep the Council regularly informed on the progress of actions taken [to
secure compliance with previous resolutions on the Gulf crisis].&quot;21
As if not enough, there are other pieces of evidence suggesting the Gulf War
was far more than a purely coordinated military action by national armed forces.
Specifically, at the very time the coalition forces received authorization for launching their offensive, the U.S., by the far the main player, offered observations which
could be construed as indicating it viewed the effort as an inclusive, global cause
extending beyond the narrow interests of the collaborating national governments.
modate

a

that

reading

to exercise

came from both President George Bush and from Secretary
of State James Baker.22 Perhaps even more telling, however, is the background
connected with the April 1991 adoption of Security Council resolution 688, by a

These observations

(1990), para. 2, adopted Nov. 29, 1990, reprinted in: 29 Int&apos;l Legal
(1990) (Security Council &quot;[a]uthorizes Member States co-operating with the Government
of Kuwait
to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) [requiring
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international
peace and security in the area&quot;).
19

See U.N. Doc. S/RES/678

Mat. 1565

20
Some have argued the feature of Security Council &quot;authorization&quot; signifies the self-defense
character of the Gulf War. See e.g., R o s t o w (note 13), at 508. This has apparently been picked up
by Professor Wedgwood as emphasizing the national, rather than U.N., aspects of the military
action brought to a halt by resolution 687. See We d g w o o d (note 7), at 726.

Security Council resolution 678 (note 19), at para. 4. See also Jochen Abr. F r o w e i n, UniInterpretation of Security Council Resolutions a Threat to Collective Security?, in: Liber
Zum 85. Geburtstag 97 at 102 (Volkmar G6tz/Peter Selmer/Riidiger
amicorum Gfinther Jaenicke
Wolfrum eds. 1998) (arguing in favor of a restrictive interpretation of resolution 678, preventing
suggestions that any claim to self-defense survived the resolution&apos;s adoption).
22
On November 29, 1990, the day the Security Council adopted resolution 678, Secretary Baker
21

See

lateral

-

-

indicated, in remarks before the Council, that the thrust of the resolution was

to

inform

Iraq

it

could

&apos;choose peace by respecting the will of the international community,&quot; or suffer the consequences. See:
1 U.S. Dep&apos;t of State Dispatch (No. 14, Nov. 29, 1990) at 297 (1990). The following day, President
Bush echoed this view by observing the quarrel was not between the U.S. and Iraq, but &quot;Iraq and the

world,&quot; and that through adoption of

678 &quot;the

Security

Council has enhanced the

keeping function of the United Nations.&quot; See ibid., at 295
conference). Two and one-half weeks later, in a statement
vein that he

declared in the

same

deadline,

action

some

to

(opening
at

statement at

NATO

expected Iraq might undertake,

legitimate

peace-

White House

Headquarters, Secretary

news

Baker

before resolution 678s withdrawal
community to use force.&quot;

undercut the &quot;collective will of the international

Dispatch (No. 17, Dec. 24, 1990) at 351 (1990) (Dec. 17, 1990, remarks at
NATO).
The international, U.N. aspects of the then impending military action also seem evident in a
response given by Secretary Baker, at a November 29, 1990, news conference, to a reporter&apos;s question
See: 1 U.S. Dep&apos;t of State

concerning

the command and control of coalition

between coalition nations
the U.S. would
the Korean

act

on

a

decision

independently,

operation

to

and* in that

had been carried

out

military

commence

context

in 1950.

units. The question related to coordination
Desert Storm. It was asked if

Operation

the

questioner

Secretary

Baker

referenced the way in which
careful to emphasize the

was
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Iraq

3, with two abstentions.23 This resolution was aimed at ending Iraq&apos;s
of
its Kurdish population in the north, and Shiite population in the
repression
south, repression that commenced when the damage inflicted by Operation Desert

vote

the

of domestic

surfacing

hostility

towards

Baghdad.24 Interestingly

had Britain, the U.S., and France, the major countries that provided
protection under the resolution, perceived the Gulf War cease-fire as bringing to

enough,

a

halt

collaborative military campaign of a merely national character, they would
to seek independent authority from the U.N. for what ulti-

a

have felt little need

mately

became

Operation

Provide Comfort and

there had been debate about the &quot;domestic

Operation Southern Watch. True,
jurisdiction&quot; limitation in Charter

article 2, paragraph 7.25 But the fact that affirmative authority was sought in order to justify intervention in territory where recently halted military action had
contributed

to the domestic situation suggests recognition that the military action
itself had been conducted under the umbrella of the United Nations, despite

retention of formal control

by

national

A second argument advanced

national

military

force

to

unilaterally

military

authorities.

support the thesis that it is lawful to
to compel Iraqi observance of WMD

employ
obliga-

under

Security Council resolution 687, concerns the coalition state air strikes
on January 13, 1993.26 Of particular significance is the fact that these
strikes were taken without advance approval or specific authorization by the
United Nations Security Council. The strikes were designed to respond to a January 7, 1993, decision by Iraq to prevent UNSCOM from using the Habbaniyah
airfield for short-notice weapons inspections.27 Surely, so the argument goes, if
non-U.N. authorized military force of a national character has been employed by
former coalition states in the past to enforce Iraqi inspection obligations, then its
use would seem equally as acceptable now or in the future.
tions

against Iraq

collective and cooperative nature of future action. Though he did not pick up on the reference to the
action in Korea, one reading of his
response is that future action was not envisioned as being
purely national in character. See: I U.S. Dept of State Dispatch (No. 14, Dec. 3, 1990) at 299, 300 01
U.N.

-

(1990).
23

See U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991), adopted Apr. 5, 1991, reprinted in: 30 Int&apos;l Legal Mat. 858
(1991). Beyond the fact that Security Council resolution 688 evidences the continuing nature of the
U.N.&apos;s involvement in decisions about how the fall-out from the Gulf War is to be handled, and a

refusal
Fr

to

o we

use

i

n

allow member

(note

2 1),

at

states unilaterally to arrogate to themselves all decisional authority, see
106, for the view that that resolution cannot be interpreted as authorizing the

of force

24

against Iraq.
repressions,
Int&apos;l J. Refugee L.

On the

Howard Adelman, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the
(1992); Middle East Watch, The Anfal Campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan: The
Destruction of Koreme (1993).
25
Jane E. S t r o m s e t h, Iraqs Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and
Continuing Challenges, in: Enforcing Restraint 83-90 (Lori Damrosch ed., 1993).
26
See We d g w o o d (note 7), at 727-28.

Kurds, 4

27

into

See: Statement

by

see

4

the President of the

Security

Council

Concerning

United Nations

Flights

(1993) (condemnation of the Iraqi action as a &quot;material
breach&quot; of obligations under resolution 687). See also: Note by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/25091 (1993).

Iraqi Territory,

U.N. Doc. S/25081
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Obviously, what is especially troubling for such a contention are the circumstances surrounding Secretary- General Kofi Annan&apos;s February 23, 1998, memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Iraq on UNSCOM inspections of presidential palaces,2 ,8 and its implementing Security Council resolution, 1154 .29 Two
exist for this view. First, it

reasons

must

be remembered that, when

Iraq

in late

1997 balked at permitting UNSCOM to inspect presidential
the response of the international community was ultimately diplomatic
rather than military.30 There was no rush to use military force such as might have
been expected had the January 1993 air strikes left no doubt about what the law
Second, the language chosen by the Security Council in resolution

Fall, early Winter

palaces,

permitted.31

Secretary-General&apos;s MOU steered well away from authorstates to resort unilaterally to the use of force in the event of an
izing
Iraqi breach of that new commitment.32 While the Council opted for the ambigable to accommodate
uous language of &quot;severest consequences,&quot; language plainly
if
the possibility of force, the formulation seems peculiar
past practice really
evidenced the permissibility of unilateral, national determinations to take military
1154 to

implement

the

individual

action.33 When

to

all of this is added the fact that resolution 678&apos;s basic Gulf War
use of force speaks, in paragraph 2, only of uses

&quot;authoriz[ation]&quot; concerning the
to

&quot;implement Security

subsequent relevant

Council Resolution 660 and

adjudge any past future unilateral use
each of the resolutions mentioned in
because
is
lawful.
This
force
national
of
form
in
or another, Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait,
one
paragraph 2 addresses,
that
not WMD inspections, a matter
only arose following the conclusion of the
Resolutions,

&quot;34

it would

seem

difficult

to

or

Gulf War.

Apart from the

circumstances associated with the

resolution 1154, and
for hesitancy about

paragraph 2
accepting

of resolution 678, there are several other reasons
January 1993 attack on Iraq as demonstrating

the

the lawfulness of non-U.N. authorized national

28

Reprinted

A8, col.
29

Secretary- General&apos;s MOU,

in: How Accord Will Work:

Special Group

uses

of

is Set

Up,

military
N.Y.

force

to

compel

Times, Feb. 24, 1998,

at

5.

See U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 154,

adopted

2 March 1998, available

at:

http://wwwun.org/plweb-cgi/

March 12, 1998).
international politi30 It
must be acknowledged that, in spite of the eventual diplomatic solution,
cal tensions were on a razors edge. The U.S., in particular, had undertaken a large scale military build
and was thought to be preparing for a strike against targets in Iraq.
in the

since.cgi?dbname=scres&amp;foryear=1998 (accessed

region

up

between Security
extent, it must be acknowledged that the deterioration of relations
occurring from 1991 to 1997-98 may have played a role here.
32
Certainly there were Security Council members who supported language that would have
authorized force to be used in the event of a breach. Nonetheless, their proposals were incapable of
securing approval of the Council. On the debates in the Council, see: U.N. Press Release
31

To

some

Council peers

3858th mtg., 2 March 1998, available at: http://wwwun.org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pl?215
+unix+ -free-+wwwun.org..80+un+un+prl 998+prl 998++ %26 (accessed Mar. 17, 1998).
33 See
Security Council resolution 1154 (note 29), at para. 3. See Frowein (note 21), at 110

SC/6483,

(indicating &quot;severest consequences&quot; can include military force, but concluding that resolution
requires further Security Council authorization before resort can be had to that option).
34
See Security Council resolution 678 (note 19), at para. 2.
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Iraq

comply with its WMD inspection obligations. For openers, the circumstances. surrounding the January 1993 attack indicate that Iraqi incursions into
Kuwait to retrieve weaponry left behind on withdrawal, and deployment of Iraqi
antiaircraft missiles in and near no-fly zones, served as more of a provocation than
Baghdad

to

actions connected with UNSCOM short-notice
it would

seem

difficult

to

draw from the

it occurred in response to, and

set a

mere

inspection activities.35

Given this,

fact of the attack the inference that

precedent for,

breaches of Iraqs

inspection

commitments.

Additionally, Security Council resolution 678, the resolution which
authorized coalition states to use force in the first place, and resolution 687, which
ended the Gulf War and established

Iraqs

WMD

obligations,

as

well

as a

series of

other U.N. instruments, including resolution 715, the presidential palaces MOU,
and resolution 1154, all indicate the Security Council views itself as seized of the
under Chapter VII of the Charter.36 Given the Council&apos;s authority
Chapter VII regarding the use of force, it would seem somewhat of a stretch
to ignore the Council&apos;s repeated
expressions and accept unilateral, national decisions free of U.N. control. As one distinguished, senior international law scholar
stated on a related point concerning the use of force against Iraq: &quot;[even to] characterize the [Gulf War] military action as collective self-defense rather than as a
United Nations action does not imply that the use of force was [or is] wholly a
matter of discretion for the cooperating states; ...-.37 Further, there are the reactions by the members of the Security Council to the recent British-U.S. attack of
December 16-19, 1998. The reactions involved a combination of muted approval
and clear criticism for the use of military force.38 The implication is that of a real
reluctance on the Council&apos;s part to see any past national military attack on Iraq as
indicative of some ongoing permission to use force to compel that nation to meet
its WMD obligations.
The objective in recounting each of the preceding reasons for questioning

Iraq

matter

under

whether the Gulf War cease-fire and the

January 13, 1993, air strikes on Iraq supthe
of
national
force
to secure observance of that nation&apos;s
application
port
military
WMD obligations, has not been to suggest some fundamental opposition to the
35

See Michael R. G o r d o n, Bush Said to Plan Air Strike on Iraq Over Its Actions, N.Y Times,
Jan. 13, 1993, at Al, col. 5 (listing a variety of provocations). It should also be noted that, unlike the
Gulf War itself, several nations, including China, were less than enthusiastic
supporters, thus reflecting on the clarity of the strikes as permissible under international law. See: (Op-Ed) just Punishment
for Iraqs Offenses, N.Y. Times, Jan 14, 1993, at A24, col. 1 (China not supportive); Youssef M. I b
r a h i in, Many Arabs See &apos;Double Standard&apos;..., N.Y Times, Jan. 15, 1993, at A8, col. 4 (several Gulf
states critical).
36
On resolution 678, see (note 19) at third paragraph of the preamble; on resolution 687, see (note
3) at para. 34; on resolution 715, see U.N. Doc. S/RES/715, adopted 11 Oct. 1991, available at:
http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres07l5.htm (accessed Jan. 10, 1999); on the MOU, see (note
28) at para. 1; on resolution 1154, see (note 29) at para. 5.
37
See S c h a c h t e r (note 13), at 460 (emphasis added).
38
See: International Reaction: Critics From Paris to Kuwait, but a Friend in London, N.Y. Times,
at Dec. 18, 1998, at A21, col. 1; Barbara Crossette, At the U.N., Alliances of Cold War Are
Renewed, ibid., at Al 9, col. 6; Michael R. G o r d o n, Moscow Orders U.S. Envoy Home to Protest
Air Strikes, ibid., at A21, col. 5.

-
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military option.

It is

beyond dispute

theless,

in

light

occasionally arise
well
be just such a
might
Iraq

that instances

little choice. The WMD situation with

of the fact armed force is

perhaps

members of the world

possession of the various
never be e x p I a i n e d as based
those

the

single

which leave
case.

None-

greatest power in the

community,

resort to

it should

it is absolutely clear
prevailing legal
rules provide complete justification. It is the prohibition on the use of force,

rules unless

on

permissions concerning such, that the U.N. Charter articulates in its opening provisions. Self-defense, individual or collective, as well as U.N. applied or
authorized military force, are all tucked back in Chapter VIL seemingly creating
in a
a presumption of sorts. In the event the use of military force is felt essential
not

the

situation where the law suggests impermissibility, the preference should be for an
explanation grounded in the non-legal. Arguments of lawfulness are likely to be
perceived as disingenuous dissembling, undermining the sanctity of law needed
for

increasing

its role in

affecting

III. An Undiscussed

the actual conduct of

Option for Future

WMD

states.

Inspections

in

Iraq

nationally applied military force to secure
inspection obligations is an extremely important
by Iraq
the
from
one. However,
standpoint of a peaceful resolution of the very matter that
that
issue, finding an option capable of both restarting the inspection
generates
Such would serve
process and keeping it moving forward is far more important.
would
be
there
would
that
insure
only a minimal
two clear purposes. First, it
untold
chance of military force being used against Iraq, thus saving
suffering and
into the commuprecious tax dollars, and perhaps accelerating Iraq&apos;s reintegration
The issue of non-U.N. authorized

observance

of its WMD

nity of nations. And second, it would contribute to resumption and maintenance
of a regime aimed at regulating Iraqi activity in the field of WMD, an area
currently of great concern to defense analysts.
In

the immediate aftermath of the December

national

16-19, 1998, British and

targets in Iraq, the level
United
Nations officials
and
policymakers
WMD
reticence regarding
inspections has

U.S.cruise missile attacks and air strikes

against military

discussion by key
representatives about Baghdad&apos;s
accelerated substantially. To a certain extent, this acceleration reflects the growing
splits within the Security Council that have gradually surfaced since the Gulf
War.39 It is also evidence of increasing frustration on the part of the Council, frustration born of eight long, arduous years filled with constant Iraqi footdragging
and prevarication. Additionally, the acceleration may represent a testimonial to
the skill and adroitness of Saddam Hussein in playing one state against another,
tweaking the U.S. and UNSCOM at what he considers precisely the right
moment. Irrespective of the factors that have contributed to the acceleration in
of

public

and

text accompanying note 31. The splits, at least in part, are the result of the inclination of
like ]France, Russia, and China to be autonomous in the matters of international relations. In
the case of Russia, national political pressures may also play a contributory role.

39

See

states
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public discussion about what to do on Iraq and its WMD inspections,
of proposals have been voiced. Perhaps the one subject to the greatest
suggestion that Saddam

has been the

Hussein be removed from

a

variety

attention

power.40

While

removal may result in a government committed to fulfilling its inspection obligations and restoring friendly relations with its neighbors, it might also produce a

resulting in Iraq being totally or partially dismembered, thereby contribinstability in the region.41 However, on the assumputing to
tion that Iraq&apos;s political leadership will remain unchanged, other options affecting
the WMD inspection process have also been put forward. Two of these options in
particular, the French option and the U.S. option, warrant brief description.
The French option was circulated to the members of the Security Council
civil

war,

further friction and

within four weeks of the

commencement

U.S. air strikeS.42 It attempts
and weapons inspections by

to

of the December 1998 British and

deal with the twin issues of economic sanctions

proposing

a

phased lifting

of sanctions,

beginning

first with oil, removing sanctions on other items in accordance with Iraqi cooperation on future weapons inspections.43 The proposal put forward by France
would also replace UNSCOM with a &quot;renewed control commission&quot; responsible

monitoring prohibited Iraqi WMD activities, rather than for conducting intrusive inspections designed to get a handle on Iraqs past weapons programs.44
Another important feature of the French option would be the substitution of a
financial surveillance system for the existing oil-for-food escrow account. The idea
would be to insure Iraq avoided utilizing its oil revenues for objectionable
weapons activities, but this would be accomplished without requiring advance
U.N. permission for disbursements from an earmarked account.45
The U.S. option was offered immediately on the heels of the proposal coming
from Paris. It differs radically from the French option in that it suggests little
beyond removing the current cap of $5.2 billion every six months on the amount
of revenues Iraq is permitted to generate by export sales of oil.46 The U.S. proposal would leave UNSCOM in place, and also the rules that body administers.47
Moreover, it would continue to insist upon full compliance by Iraq with its WMD
inspection obligations prior to any lifting of the economic embargo against that
for

40

See:

(Editorial) Unseating Saddam Hussein, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1998, at A30. Col. 1; James
Calling for New Iraq Government, But Has No Plan to Oust Current One, N.Y. Times,

R i s e n, U.S.
Dec.

23,

tion.html
41

1998,

at:

http://wwwnytimes.com/library/world/mideast/122398iraq-opposi-

Dec. 23, 1998).
See Tom Rau m, U.S.-Iraq Policy Criticized

Col. 2

(Marine
instability).
42

available

(accessed

General

See Barbara C r o s

Jan. 14, 1999,

at

43

See ibid.

44

See ibid.

45

See ibid.

46

See

Anthony
s e tt

e,

by General,

Zinni fears efforts

to

Tulsa World, Jan. 29, 1999,

at

A5,

overthrow Saddam Hussein will result in

France, in Break With U.S., Urges End

to

Iraq Embargo,

N.Y

Times,

A6, Col. 3.

Jane P e r I e z, U.S. Proposes Easing

U.N. Curbs

on

Iraq Oil,

N.Y.

Times, Jan. 15, 1999, As,

Col. 1.
47

See ibid.
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approach

At the
to

same

assuring

time, the proposal retains* the existing

that

escrow

account

generated by permitted Iraqi oil exports are
and humanitarian purchases, and the payment

revenues

diverted from food, medicine,
of Gulf War compensation claims.49 In that regard, it is interesting to note that
recent reports indicate the poor condition of Iraqs oil production facilities have

not

effectively limited sales to around $3.5 billion every six monthS.50 Given this, it
seems questionable that, in the absence of modifications of some other sort, the
mere removal of the oil revenues cap is likely to induce renewed and continued
cooperation by Baghdad with U.N. weapons inspectors.
Indications suggest that it is Iraqs chemical weapons file that remains the principal WMD file of concern.51 This suggestion derives from a number of factors,
with two being particularly prominent: evidence from June 1998 that the deadly
nerve agent VX had been loaded on the warheads of Iraqi projectileS;52 and
discovery by inspectors, in July of that same year, of a document suggesting Iraq,
in its earlier declarations to the U.N., vastly underestimated the number of weap8 8) with Iran.53
ons armed with chemical devices during its Ei ght Year War (19 80
be
factors
these
as
a
two
seen
can
Together,
representing continuing effort by Iraq
to refuse to provide full and complete disclosure on its chemical weapons
programs.54
It cannot be said with certainty what really viable options exist for restarting the
WMD inspections process and keeping it moving forward. Only time will tell
whether the French or the U.S. proposals actually fall into that category. Apart
from those two, there is one option in particular that specifically addresses Iraq&apos;s
chemical weapons file, and has escaped any noticeable degree of public discussion
by officials of interested nation-states. Prior to turning attention to that option,
there is another option that bears at least brief mention. Specifically, that other
option would involve conditionally lifting the entire U.N. imposed trade embargo
for a limited time, say 90 days, with extensions dependent upon the resumption of
complete, unconditional cooperation by Iraq within a time certain. The broad
-

48

See ibid.

49

See ibid.

50

See ibid.

51

See Barbara Crossette and Steven

Erlanger, Allies See Bombing of Iraq as Inevitable:
Likely to Break Vow, U.S. Says, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1998, at Al, col. 6, at A8, col. 1 (Chief
UNSCOM inspector sees fewer problems on ballistic missiles than on chemical weapons, with not
enough known on biological weapons activities).
52
See Christopher S.Wren, Iraq Insists It&apos;s Being Candid with U.N. Arms Inspectors, N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1998, at A6, col. 5; Christopher S.Wren, Lab Reports of Iraq Poison Bolster Case
for Sanctions, N.Y Times, June 24, 1998, at A9, col. 1; Christopher S. W r e n, U.N. Arms Inspector
Firm on Iraq Nerve Gas but Accepts New Tests, N.Y Times, June 25, 1998, at A10, col. 1.
53
See Barbara C r o s s e t t e, Iraq Backtracks In New Defiance Over Inspections, N.Y Times,
Nov. 23, 1998, at Al, col. 6, at A10, col. 2; UNSCOM Chairman Butler&apos;s Report to UN SecretaryGeneral, 15 Dec. 1998, available at: http://wvv-wfas.org/news/un/iraq/s/butla2l6.htm (accessed Jan.
Hussein

27, 1999).
54

For the official report

on

the VX matter,

VX, U.N. Doc. S/1998/995, Annex,

see:

Report

of the

Group

of International

Experts

26 Oct. 1998.
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sufficiently attractive that Iraq might be interested
in accepting
viewing the more limited French proposal as
option,
of
the major hurdles presented by this option, a
Of
course, one
unappealing.
hurdle not inherent in France&apos;s proposal, is the fact Iraq would be expected to
allow UNSCOM itself to renew its inspection activities.55 That has been an especially sensitive matter for Baghdad. In various public fora it has painted the U.N.
Special Commission as biased and partial. On the positive side, however, to the
scope of any such

move

extent

may be

while

the

the British and the U.S. remain insistent the present inspection
a conditional lifting of the entire trade embargo may restart

left intaCt,56

regime be
inspec-

an

tion process that will produce a thorough investigation of Iraq&apos;s WMD programs.
Attention is now turned to the option alluded to in the preceding paragraph as

specifically addressing Iraq&apos;s chemical weapons file. This option differs radically
anything yet proposed to date and, again, has not been the subject of any real
public discussion. The primary feature of the option would be to shift responsibilfrom

the chemical weapons front to The Hague based Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), established to oversee compliance

ity

on

with the

of the

obligations

newly

effective Chemical Weapons Convention of
option is that it walks a middle path

1993.57 The attraction of the OPCW

between,
and

Iraq

hand, completely lifting the embargo or eliminating the
inspection regime and, on the other, insisting that the embargo remain

on

UNSCOM

the

one

requisite obeisance to UNSCOM and its weapons
by France also vests some entity other than
responsibility for assuring that Iraq does
a WMD redevelopment effort. Clearly, given Iraq&apos;s perception of
as prejudiced, this attribute provides either option with a certain

continue

to

show the

proposal put forward
inspectors.
the U.N. Special Commission with
The

not mount

UNSCOM

appeal.
proposal, however, the OPCW option would leave
inspections in place, thereby appealing as well to those concerned about
Iraq having to come clean on its chemical weapons activities. Such inspections
could result from having the Organization continue to apply the extant UNSCOM inspection rules to Iraq, or simply having the familiar terms of the CWC
Distinct from the French

intrusive

League has recently indicated its support
Iraq fully complies with its WMD obligations, while
criticizing the British-U.S. air strikes of December 16 -19. See Douglas J e h 1, As Arab League Urges
Iraqis to Obey the U.N., They Walk Out of the Meeting, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1999, at A10, col. 1.
55

for

Attention should also be drawn

maintenance

56

of the economic

On the fact Britain may be

Barbara C r o s s

e

t t e,

to

the fact the Arab

embargo

until

prepared

to

back away from the present UNSCOM regime, see
on Keeping the Iraq Sanctions, N.Y. Times,

U.S. More Isolated In U.N.

at A8, col. 1.
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, done at Paris, 13 Jan. 1993, reprinted in: 32 Int&apos;l Legal
Mat. 800 (1993). For a review of the Convention&apos;s history, see Walter Krutzsch/Ralf Trapp, A
Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (1994). On the export control aspects of the
Convention, see Rex J. Zedalis, New Export Controls for Chemicals on the Horizon?, 30 Intl

Jan. 12, 1999,
57

at

Al, col. 5,

See: Convention

on

Lawyer 141 (1996); Rex J. Zedalis, The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation ActUnited States Control Over Exports, 90 Am. J. Int&apos;l L. 138 (1996) (reviewing an earlier proposed
version of the U.S. domestic implementing legislation).
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applied

instead. As with the UNSCOM

rules, those provided in the CWC would
subject its past chemical weapons activities, including activities
connected with potential weapons precursor chemicals, to declaration and on-site
verification inspections.58 Relative to inspections, though, there are numerous

require Iraq

to

differences between the

two sets of rules that must be considered in the context
of any decision about which should be applied to Iraq. For example, the CWC
provides for &quot;routine&quot; and &quot;challenge&quot; inspections.59 In many cases, routine

hour advance notice,60 and even challenge inspecleast twelve hours, 61 with the possibility of challenge inspectors not being
transported by the nation to be inspected to the specific site any earlier than

inspections require forty-eight

tions

at

twenty-four

hours after arrival

at

the so-called

point

of

entry.62

permit unannounced, surprise inspections.63 Another example

challenge inspection
identified

may

only

that caused

seek facts related

to

the

UNSCOM rules
is that

particular

CWC

a

limited and

certain CWC state-party to exercise its authority
that
the CIPCW carry out the inspection.64 UNSCOM has not been so
request

to

concern

shackled.65
cance

Clearly,

a

such differences

of the differences has

to

are

important. Nonetheless, the full signifiagainst the background of the CWC

be considered

inspection regime being thought of as sufficient to prevent many nations much
more powerful and scientifically sophisticated than Iraq from constituting a chemical weapons arsenal.
In the event a shift

to the OPCW is deemed of interest, there can be no doubt
that it has support in the documents that created the existing UNSCOM inspection
regime. Paragraph 25 of S/22614,66 the Security Council&apos;s plan for the information

and weapons destruction phases of the Iraqi WMD regime, envisions
the establishment of an ongoing monitoring and verification phase.67 With reference

gathering

58

See: Chemical Weapons Convention, arts. I-V, ibid. at 804-09, and especially art. III(l)(c), ibid.
806, indicating that required declarations concerning production facilities cover any facility that
&quot;has had&quot; chemical weapons production. Given that art. II(1), ibid. at 804, contains an extremely
broad definition of chemical weapons, a wide range of production facilities will be involved.
59
See Barry K e I I in a n, David S. G u a I t i e r i and Edward A. Ta n z in a n, Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Control Verification Can Proceed Without Threatening Confidential Business
Information, 36 Harv. Int&apos;l LJ. 71 at 87 (1995).
at

60

See CWC

61

See ibid.

at 824, 859, Verification Annex, Pt. VII (30).
817, art. IX(15).
62
See ibid. at 865, Verification Annex, Pt. X(14).
63 See: Plan for
Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq&apos;s Compliance with Relevant
Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/22871/Rev.1, 2 October
1991 at 5, paras. 17(c) and 18(c).
64
See (note 60), Pt. X(44)-(45).
65
See (note 63), at 13, Annex I, para. 2(e), and at 14, para. 5.
66
See: Plan for the Implementation of Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution

687

(note 57),

at

at 6, para. 25, U.N. Doc. S/22614, 17 May 1991.
The details of that phase are further spelled out in

(1991)

67

two other Security Council documents:
S/22871/Rev.1 (note 63); and Plan for Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraqs Compliance with Paragraph 12 of Part of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and with the

Requirements of Paragraphs

3 and 5 of Resolution 707

(1991),

U.N. Doc. S/22872/Rev. 1, 20

Septem-

ber 1991.
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paragraph
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that time the

proposed Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The immediately
following sentence then provides that &quot;[w]ith the eventual entry into force of such
a Convention, the inspectorate envisaged in it should at an appropriate time
take over the function of monitoring and verification of compliance in the area of
chemical weapons.1168 Arguably, the Security Council was thinking about a time
following the completion of the tasks of the U.N. Special Commission. But even if
one were to view the on-again-off-again nature of the inspections in Iraq over the
past couple of years as suggesting the time is now &quot;appropriate&quot; for turning in the
OPCW&apos;s

direction,

two matters

would still remain.

The first would involve the fact

shift

that,

since

Iraq

the OPCW that looks toward that

party to the CWC, any
applying the rules of the CWC
is

not a

body
legally obligating Baghdad to adhere to prescriptions and duties therein spelled out. Presumably, such a device would not prove
troublesome. After all, if Iraq found it attractive to move the responsibility for the
chemical weapons file out of UNSCOM, it could accept the condition precedent
to

would

require

some

device for

it become a state-party to the CWC, or at least commit to the application of
the Convention&apos;s rules. The second matter would involve the whole issue of

that

supervision of Iraq&apos;s files on biological weapons and ballistic missile systems. The
OPCW is charged with supervising chemical weapons. And while there may be a
certain degree of overlap with biological weapons, there would unquestionably be
resistance to having such placed under the authority of the new Hague-based
Organization. However, international negotiations are now underway to create
verification mechanisms for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and once
concluded might provide a device comparable to the OpCW.69 As for ballistic
missile systems, satellite surveillance is currently capable of detecting tests violative of prohibitions aimed at preventing development of a missile capability. Thus,
removing UNSCOM from the mix should not prove especially problematic in
stemming further Iraqi work on such systems.
IV Conclusion

Hopefully, the international community will be able to work its way through
problem with Iraq. In retrospect, though, there can be little question
that this has been an immensely complicated and draining experience. Nonetheless, we should keep in the bright forefront of our minds that we have it within
our power to shape the future destiny of our world. The choices we make regarding how international law is to be understood and applied in this and other comthe WMD

I

68

See

69

See:

note

66.

(Associated Press),

(present Treaty

seek

to

establish

Germ Warfare

commits states-parties

an

Tulsa World, Jan. 23, 1999, at AS, col.
stockpile bioweapons, and negotiations

Treaty Advances,

not to

develop

or

inspection regime).
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difficult situationS,70 and the time and attention we accord to making
effort
to explore all available avenues for solving intractable problems, will
every
future generations are able to marvel at the patience and disciwhether
determine

parably

pline

that made them inheritors of

how unfortunate

at

it was

that

we

ordered society,

a more

missed

or

remark with regret

important opportunities.

collapse of the Iron Curtain, we have been the beneficiaries of many
perhaps to cure, but certainly to palliate, some of the insidious social
political maladies that afflict relations between the members of the interna-

Since the

&apos;hances,

c

and

not

is running out. Every day we face immense pressures to
the old ways, or replace ideologies that truly have been discarded with
new progenitors of suspicion and division. Unless each and every nation-state, up
and down the board, commits now to making a genuine and indefatigable effort

tional

community. Time

return to

about the law, and seeking novel ways to solve old problems,
may assure that generations to come will labor under the exact same compulsions that have shadowed humanity since the dawn of time. Fear, frustration, and

speaking frankly

at

we

force will be the

justice

only

will remain

as

rule that

elusive

as

really prevails. Understanding, compassion,
they are today.

and

Security Council resolutions dealing with
military force, and, because of the sanctity
of state sovereignty and the Council&apos;s retention of oversight on the matter, should be construed as
requiring specific U.N. authorization prior to the employment of such).
70

the

See F r o w e i

Iraqi

situation

n

(note 2 1),

seem not to

at

97 -112

permit

(arguing

unilateral

that the

use

of
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